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2Introduction
• Historically, the government structured its acquisition regulations 
and business practices in a way that resulted primarily in 
transactional exchanges between the government and industry.
• With the formal adoption of Performance-Based Logistics in 
2001, performance-based contracting has created the need for 
the government to better understand how to both design and 
govern long-term relationships with their suppliers.
• We develop a conceptual model that provides a framework for 
assessing how knowledge of variables such as environmental 
uncertainty, task stability, technology application certainty, risk, 
and transaction-specific investments impact the selection of the 
optimal mode of governance.
Legacy Contracting
• Formal Contracts
– A legally-binding agreement that defines the roles, rules, and outcomes that are to be 
achieved and how they are to be achieved.
– Several scholars have differing views as to the degree of impact formal contracts have 
on the relationship as well as the overall level of success one could achieve as a result 
of having formal contracts. (Child, 1972; Aldrich, 1979; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Fehr 
and Gachter, 2000; Cannon et al., 2000; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; etc.) 
• Theoretical Framework
– Transaction Cost Economics (TCE): Original
• Two basic principles: (1) human beings are bounded rationally, and (2), as a result of being 
rationally bound, will always choose to further their own self-interest (i.e., opportunism).
• Williamson (1985) argues that formal contracts are the primary solution for combating 
opportunistic behavior.
• Potential culprits for TCE in the defense industry could be the following: budget cycle, rapidly 
evolving technology, a bimodal distribution in the age and knowledge of government 
employees, and the gap that exists between first and third-tier suppliers (Chao, 2005).
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Performance-Based Contracting
• Preferred performance-based contracting approach is long-term 
contracts; therefore, DoD is not only investing in the acquisition of a 
product but also in a relationship.




• “Modern Institutional Economics focuses on the institution of property, and on the systems of 
norms governing the acquisition or transfer of property rights” (Furubotn & Richter, 1991).
– Relational Exchange Theory
• Cooperative norms as being the relational norms that exist outside of the formal contract and 
we consider cooperative norms to be complementary to formal contracts.
• Relational norms are the means by which the legal conditions described in a formal contract are 
satisfied.
– Network Theory
• Emphasizes the normative and social structure in which exchanges are embedded as the 
primary determinant of behavior (Baron & Hannan, 1994).  Concepts such as trust play a 
prominent role in network explanations (Achrol & Kotler, 1999).
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Latest Thinking — “Plural Form” Governance
• Difficulty of infusing economic with relational perspectives have 
led to the joining of these frameworks. 
• According to Bradach and Eccles (1989), exchange is best 
understood as embedded in a complex matrix of economic, 
social, and political structures and that governance relies on 
combinations of market, social, and/or authority-based 
mechanisms more than any one of these exclusively.
• In a generic sense, plural form governance is the combination of 
legal and non-legal (i.e., social) conventions against the 





Theory and practice suggest that incorporating both legal (i.e., 
contractual) and non-legal (e.g., social norms) conventions into the 
acquisition and sustainment process, will enhance the Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) contractors’ ability to 




– Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS)
• Contract Data








– ACAT 1C & 1D Programs
• Functional Capability Areas: Battlespace Awareness (1), Command 
& Control (1), Focused Logistics (3), Force Application (9), Force 
Protection (1), Net Centric (1)
– Timeline: Based upon a combination of FPDS and DAMIR data (roughly 
1992-Present)










CH‐47F Chinook Army 1C Focused Logistics 1998‐Present
Patriot PAC‐3 Army 1C Force Protection 1994‐Present
FBCB2 Army 1C Command & Control 1995‐Present
F‐22A Raptor Air Force 1D Force Application 1996‐Present
C‐5M Super Galaxy Air Force 1C Focused Logistics 1999‐Present
C‐17A Globemaster III Air Force 1C Focused Logistics 1995‐Present
V‐22 Osprey Navy 1D Force Application 1992‐Present
F/A‐18E/F Super Hornet Navy 1C Force Application 1997‐Present
EA‐18G Growler Navy 1D Force Application 2002‐Present
EFV Navy 1D Force Application 1997‐Present
AH‐1Z & UH‐1Y Navy 1D Force Application 1997‐Present
F‐35 Joint Strike Fighter Joint Service 1D Force Application 2001‐Present
JSOW Joint Service 1C Force Application 1997‐Present
RQ‐4A/B Global Hawk Joint Service 1D Battlespace Awareness 2001‐Present
AMRAAM Joint Service 1C Force Application 1997‐Present
Navstar GPS Joint Service 1D Net Centric 1997‐Present
C-5 Galaxy
• Prime Contractor: Lockheed Martin, since 1965.
• C-5 History
– The C-5 is a heavy-cargo transport designed to provide strategic airlift for deployment 








– Joint effort with Lockheed, GE and 
Honeywell
• Relevance to Research
– CREP
– Commercial based approach
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C-17A Globemaster III
• Prime Contractor: McDonnell Douglas (Boeing), since 1981. 
• C-17A History
– The C-17 is a four engine turbofan aircraft capable of airlifting large payloads over 
intercontinental ranges without refueling. 
– Biggest contribution to the present airlift system is long range direct delivery. 
• Issues
– Technology was not well-defined
– Technologies were not new but used in new ways
• Contracts
– Performance-Based requirements




• Traditional modes of governance and contracting 
have changed.
• Current modes such as PBC create unsustainable 
contracts in an environment that funds year to year.
• Thus, new thinking implies that plural forms of 
governance are required to better manage programs 
for mutually agreed to performance metrics. 
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